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1. Summary 
This review provides a summary of the evidence on Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) between China 
and developing countries in Africa and Asia. Specifically, it looks at the evidence on how IFFs to 
and from China impact on developing countries, as well as on the drivers of IFFs and of how 
flows are facilitated. The review draws upon a combination of academic and grey literature 
sources, though it is not exhaustive and only draws upon English language sources. 
IFFs have attracted significant international attention in recent years, due to large estimates of 
their global value and concern regarding the impact of those flows on developing countries. 
However, as pointed out in a recent K4D paper on IFFs in North Africa "large uncertainties" 
regarding the magnitude of flows remain (Price, 2019).  
There is still no consensus definition of IFFs, with an ongoing debate on whether legal tax 
avoidance measures should be included. However, a frequently used definition, and the one 
employed for the purposes of this report, comes from the IMF: IFFs "refer to the movement of 
money across borders that is illegal in its source (e.g. corruption, smuggling), its transfer (e.g. tax 
evasion), or its use (e.g. terrorist financing)." 
IFFs involving China have attracted particular attention, due to estimates suggesting it is 
responsible for the largest IFFs by value globally. However, little has been published to date 
specifically on IFFs between China and developing countries. This paper attempts to help 
address this gap. 
Section 2 provides some background information on the debates and uncertainties around IFFs, 
including conceptual issues, difficulties in measuring these flows and their potential impacts, as 
well as attempts to quantify China's overall IFFs. Section 3 focuses on trade-related IFFs 
between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. Discrepancies indicative of potential 
IFFs are identified using trade data from 2018 and an attempt is made to determine the scale of 
the revenue consequences of trade mis-invoicing for China's developing country partners. 
Section 4 considers IFFs-related to corrupt business practices, focusing largely on Chinese 
investment in Africa. Section 5 moves on to consider IFFs that relate to the trade in illegal 
products, including illegal narcotics, human trafficking, the illegal arms trade, the illegal wildlife 
trade, the illegal organ trade and the trade in counterfeit products. Finally, Section 6 discusses 
enabling environment factors relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries. 
Key findings: 
IFFs related to the trade in legitimate products 
• Finding 1: Discrepancies in trade figures between China and developing countries 
are large, with a value gap of $162 billion in 2017 - 18% of trade value (GFI, 2020). 
This is indicative of high risk of trade-related IFFs – since a key cause of such 
discrepancies is trade mis-invoicing. However, it is important to recognise that the value 
gap figure will not exactly match trade-related IFFs, since other factors can cause such 
discrepancies (e.g. clerical errors or complex patterns of re-export) and certain IFFs will 
not show up in such aggregate data (e.g. where exporter and import collude in mis-
invoicing ("double-invoice faking"). Such estimates are likely fairly inaccurate, and it is 
difficult to know whether they are biased upwards or downwards relative to the true figure 
for IFF flows. 
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• Finding 2: Discrepancies in China's trade with Asian and African partners are indicative of 
net Chinese over-invoicing of exports (which implies net IFF outflows from partner 
countries to China) and/or partner country under-invoicing of imports (which implies net 
IFF outflows from China to partner countries). Value gap analysis of Chinese imports is 
indicative of net partner country under-invoicing of exports (which implies net IFF 
outflows from partner countries to China) and/or Chinese over-invoicing of imports (which 
implies net IFF outflows from China to the partner countries). 
• Finding 3: From aggregated trade data alone the net direction of IFF flows between 
China and developing countries cannot be determined. However, analysis of the 
pattern of discrepancies, combined with evidence from qualitative research and 
relevant criminal cases, is indicative of an IFF outflow from China linked to under-
invoicing of manufacturing imports from China. IFFs may then flow back to China 
through under-invoicing of natural resources exports (potentially through transfer 
mispricing), such as oil in Angola, diamonds in South Africa and jade in Myanmar. 
Alternatively, funds may be used to buy contraband such as illegal wildlife 
products and narcotics, which are smuggled back to China. 
• Finding 4: Whilst much has sometimes been made of claims that there are net outflows 
of trade-related IFFs from developing countries, our analysis suggests that the net flow of 
IFFs between China and developing countries is of secondary importance to the role that 
trade-related IFFs flowing in both directions play in generating revenue losses and 
facilitating criminal activity. 
• Finding 5: Trade-related IFFs likely have a significant and negative impact on 
government revenue for China's developing country partners. This occurs both 
through lost tariff revenue through under-invoiced imports and losses in corporation tax 
and other revenue through under-invoicing of exports to mask profit. 
Estimates of the tariff impact are inevitably imprecise, but may give a rough sense of the 
scale of the issue. Lost tariff revenue from under-invoicing of Chinese imports in 
2018 could plausibly have been around $690 million for India, $488 million for 
Pakistan and $306 million for Myanmar, whilst Bangladesh may have lost around 
$804 million in 2015. Ghana may have lost $391 million in 2018, Kenya may have 
lost $80 million in 2016 and South Africa may have lost $720 million per annum 
from 2010-2013. 
Revenue losses from under-invoicing of exports are harder to estimate, but may 
be large. For example, an upper-bound for the revenue impact of under-invoicing 
of Angolan petroleum exports to China is around $1.9 billion in 2018 or 10% of total 
government revenue. The revenue loss for Myanmar related to illegal smuggling of jade 
to China could be on a similarly large in a country with very limited revenue collection 
capability. 
IFFs related to the trade in illegal products 
• Finding 6: IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia are enablers of the 
$426-625 billion per year international narcotics trade. This likely involves: (1) 
payments for synthetic precursors manufactured in China that are illegally smuggled to 
narcotic producing developing countries in Asia; and (2) payments for opioids and other 
narcotics smuggled into China either for Chinese domestic consumption or for onwards 
transit. 
• Finding 7: IFFs between China and developing African countries are enablers of the 
world's $7-23 billion per year illegal trade in wildlife. China is the largest market 
globally for illegal wildlife products and illegally harvested hardwoods. 
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• Finding 8: Human trafficking from Northeast and Southeast Asia to China and from 
China to other Asian countries is a serious problem. Large IFFs likely result occur 
in the form of payments to traffickers. 
• Finding 9: China is the world's leading supplier of counterfeit goods to the 
developing world, likely creating significant IFF flows. Counterfeit goods can have a 
negative revenue impact for developing countries, whilst counterfeited cigarettes and 
medicine pose significant public health risks in developing countries. 
• Finding 10: Feiqian, a traditional form of Chinese banking similar to hawala1, 
combined with trade mis-invoicing, likely facilitates IFFs linked to all these forms 
of criminality. 
2. Background information 
Defining IFFs 
There is no universally accepted definition of IFFs. For the purposes of this report the IMF 
definition of IFFs is used: " the movement of money across borders that is illegal in its source 
(e.g. corruption, smuggling), its transfer (e.g. tax evasion), or its use (e.g. terrorist financing)." For 
a review of debates around defining IFFs, including the potential to include legal tax avoidance, 
see Price (2019). 
Important motivations for IFFs include: 
• Illegal source: 
o Extraction of excess profit achieved through "unequal contracts", often as a result of 
bribes (UNECA, 2015) 
o Money laundering of criminal enterprise earnings 
• Illegal transfer: 
o Tax evasion (whether under-invoicing of exports to reduce profits in order to evade 
corporation and income tax or under-invoicing of imports to reduce customs duties) 
and illegal exploitation of subsidy regimes 
o Abusive transfer pricing (i.e. trade between linked corporations that does not apply 
"arm's-length principles") 
o Currency regulation evasion (e.g. over invoicing of imports in order to transfer money 
abroad illegally) 
• Illegal use: 
o Terrorist financing 
o Financing the drugs trade 
There are also numerous channels for the movement of funds across borders, including: 
• Bulk cash smuggling 
• Shell corporations and financial instruments 
• Informal value transfer systems 
• Trade mis-invoicing and "same invoice faking" 
 
1 A traditional system of transferring money used in Arab countries and South Asia, whereby the money is paid to 
an agent who then instructs an associate in the relevant country or area to pay the final recipient. 
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Measuring and estimating IFFs 
There is a consensus that global IFF flows are substantial (GFI, 2020; UNECA, 2015). 
Commonly used methods to measure IFFs include (UNECA, 2015, p. 90): 
• Balance of Payments approaches: 
o The World Bank residual method: This estimates IFFs as the difference 
between the balance of payments’ source of funds (external debt and foreign 
direct investment) and use of funds (current account deficit and reserves). 
o The hot money method: The hot money narrow-method estimates a country's 
net IFFs using balance of payments data. It utilises the fact that a country's 
balance of payments theoretically represents an accounting identity, such that the 
capital and current account balance out. In reality this is seldom precisely the 
case, and a term called 'net errors and omissions' is added in to return balance. 
This term captures flows that are not included in official data, and are therefore 
taken as a measure of IFFs. This method is generally considered to represent a 
very conservative estimate. 
• Trade mispricing approaches (mirror trade analysis/"value-gap analysis"): this 
assesses IFFs by looking for deliberate overvaluing or undervaluing of invoices to 
disguise the movement of money. This method only captures trade mis-invoicing – the 
over- or under-reporting of import or export volumes by an exporter or importer – and 
cannot account for "same invoice faking" (where both importer and exporter collude to 
create matching fake invoices). However, it also captures artefacts such as different 
practices between countries for product categorisation and discrepancies resulting from 
complex supply chains in which goods are exported to one country and then re-exported 
to a final destination. 
• Composite models. These combine models balance of payments and trade-based 
measures. 
No one measure is without flaws (see Price, 2019), which explains why composite models are 
often described as preferable for generating estimates of IFFs (Fontana, 2010). However, 
composite measures can lead to double-counting, which is itself problematic. In summary, any 
attempt to quantify IFFs is inherently imprecise and even the margin of error of estimates is 
difficult to determine. They should therefore be taken as indicative of order of magnitude only. 
Risk factors influencing IFFs 
UNECA (2015) lists various factors that make many developing countries particularly vulnerable 
to IFFs. This includes: 
• Weak rule of law, including corruption and conflict, as well as a lack of expertise on IFFs 
and low enforcement capacity within the relevant agencies (e.g. customs, police, etc.) 
• A poor business environment, which makes it easier to make money illegally than 
through the formal economy 
• Complex regulatory environments, which can create incentives for IFFs (e.g. export 
subsidies, tax incentive regimes for FDI, currency controls, etc.) or create weaknesses 
which make it easier for funds to flow illicitly across borders (e.g. provisions of some 
double-taxation agreements) 
• The existence of financial secrecy jurisdictions and/or tax havens, and inadequate 
regimes for disclosure of beneficial ownership. Financial secrecy jurisdictions put in place 
an elaborate framework to attract financial resources irrespective of their provenance, 
6 
whereas tax havens mainly aim to exploit differences in tax rates across different 
jurisdictions. 
• Strong incentives due to high levels of inequality, often linked to extractive industry 
wealth. 
Economic and developmental impacts of IFFs 
The potential economic and development impact of IFFs are varied and generally negative (see 
Price, 2019 for further discussion). Key issues include: 
• Encouraging corruption and making it harder to recover the proceeds of corruption. This 
weakens the rule of law and can negatively impact on economic development. 
• Negatively impacting on public services due to reduced government revenue, which can 
in turn heighten inequality, and undermine government legitimacy, the achievement of 
development outcomes and long-term economic growth. 
• Enabling circumvention of capital controls designed to prevent capital flight, which may 
undermine long-term economic growth 
• Enabling other forms of criminal activity, such as the narcotics trade, counterfeiting, 
people smuggling, the illegal trade in wildlife, which can impact negatively on human 
security and the ecology 
Estimates of China's global IFFs 
China's balance of payments' 'net errors and omissions' term for 2018 was equal to negative 160 
billion. This implies a net IFF outflow of $160 billion or 1.2% of China's GDP. For comparison the 
UK's 'net errors and omissions' imply net IFF inflows of $26 billion or 0.9% of the UK's GDP, 
whilst India's data suggests a net inflow of $1.3 billion or 0.05% of its GDP (IMF, 2020b). GFI 
(2020) estimates a larger figure of $458 billion IFFs for China in 2017, using the trade value-gap 
method. 
3. Trade-related IFFs between China and developing 
countries in Asia and Africa 
According to GFI (2020), over half of China's 2017 trade value gap, $296 billion, related to $1.67 
trillion of trade with the 36 most advanced economies. This leaves a $162 billion value gap 
related to $779 billion of trade with other countries (mainly emerging and developing countries). 
This suggests that China's trade value gap is proportionally smaller with the advanced 
economies (17.7% of trade) compared with other countries (21% of trade).  
The Brookings Institute (Signé et al, 2020) use value gap analysis to argue that between 1980 
and 2018 China was by far the largest destination for IFF outflows from Africa, receiving $226 
billion in outflows over this period. 85% of this relates to trade between 2010 and 2018 reflecting 
the huge increase in Chinese trade with Africa in recent years. They suggest illicit outflows from 
Africa to China remained below 15% of trade value from 2006 and 2010, increased from 2010-
2014 up to a peak of 26%, before declining to an average of 14% from 2015 to 2018. Brookings 
tie the spike in IFFs as a proportion of trade after 2010 to the impact of a huge Chinese stimulus 
package, introduced after the 2008 financial crisis, which led to an increase in corruption in China 
(Li and Mayraz, 2015). They suggest that the reduction from 2014 onwards may reflect the 
impact of President Xi Jinping's high-profile anti-corruption drive. 
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Unfortunately, the estimates provided by Brookings are based on some very questionable 
assumptions. Notably they assume that differences between Chinese export figures to Africa and 
partner country import figures reflect entirely import under-invoicing, and therefore IFF inflows to 
Africa, when in reality it could also reflect export over-invoicing by China and therefore IFF 
outflows from Africa. Similarly they assume that whenever African partner estimates of exports to 
China are less than Chinese estimate of import it reflects export under-invoicing by African 
partners and therefore IFF outflows, whereas it could also be Chinese import over-invoicing and 
therefore IFF inflows to Africa. Whilst it is plausible that their interpretation is correct more often 
than it is not, the real picture is likely to be far more complex than they suggest, rendering the 
estimates they provide of aggregate IFF outflows from Africa to China very dubious. Reasonable 
estimates of the direction of trade-related IFF flows between Africa and China could only be 
derived by comparing registered import and export prices with prevailing international rates (in 
order to determine whether discrepancies reflect misreporting by the exporter, importer or both). 
This analysis does not appear to have been conducted to date. 
 
See: Figure 1: Illicit financial flows between China and Africa 1998-2018 (Brookings Institute), 
Source: Signé et al. (2020, p.11), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Illicit-
financial-flows-in-Africa.pdf  
 
Whilst still requiring caution, analysis of trade data can give a sense of the level of risk of trade-
mis-invoicing related IFFs between two trade partners, and help identify particular products that 
are likely linked to IFFs. It is also possible to use trade data to give a sense of the potential 
impact on tariff revenue of IFFs, though it can only be used to upper and lower bounds, rather 
than to provide an accurate point estimate.  
The sub-sections below analyse in more detail the evidence from such analysis on trade-related 
IFFs between China and developing countries in Asia and Africa. A combination of data from 
available GFI country-level reports and new analysis conducted for the purposes of this report 
are utilised. The new analysis focused on 2018 data between China and a selection of 12 African 
and six Asian countries and utilised a simplified version of the GFI methodology (see Box 1). 
 
Box 1: methodology for identifying trade value-gaps 
The new analysis conducted for this report broadly aligns with the value-gap methodology 
utilised by GFI. For each partner the methodology involved: 
• Compared comparing Chinese and partner HS 6-digit level trade data using data from 
COMTRADE and WITS 
• Excluded "orphaned" and "lost" products (HS-codes where either China or the partner 
recorded zero trade) from further analysis 
• Excluded products labelled 'other' (HS999999) from further analysis 
• Any lines where the value of recorded exports from the source country exceeded 
recorded imports in the receiving country were classified as potential over-invoiced 
exports or under-invoiced imports' 
• Any lines where the value of recorded exports from the source country was less than 
recorded imports in the receiving country were classified as potential 'under-invoiced 
exports or over-invoiced imports' 
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Unlike the full GFI methodology, no adjustment is made for the fact that importing countries 
often report value including freight, whilst exporting countries tend to exclude freight costs. Nor 
are 'shrinkage adjustments' applied, a method GFI utilises to reduce outlier effects. These 
omissions reflect time constraints for the current assignment. 
There are multiple reasons why discrepancies in trade figures may occur. This includes 
clerical errors and differences in procedure for classifying products, which may have nothing to 
do with IFFs. The lack of adjustment for transport costs, adds in additional error, likely leading 
to some over-estimation of IFF inflows to China related to imports, and an under-estimation of 
inflows related to Chinese exports. These value-gap measures also do not capture any 'same-
invoice faking' (where the exporter and importer collude to produce identical fake invoices) and 
smuggling (i.e. trade in legal goods that is conducted entirely without reporting to the relevant 
customs agencies). Importantly, not only are estimates imprecise, but (because true IFF flows 
are largely unobservable) it is unclear whether such estimates are biased systematically 
upwards or downwards. 
As a result of all these issues, the estimates provided here (like any quantitative estimates of 
IFFs), should be treated with caution. They provide some sense of the orders of magnitude of 
trade-related IFFs and can be used to derive estimates of the potential consequences of these 
flows for government revenue in developing countries. It also provides some leads regarding 
particular products where Chinese trade is likely tied to large IFFs. 
This analysis suggests that Chinese exports to developing countries are characterised by either 
under-invoicing of imports in the partner country or over-invoicing of exports in China. In contrast, 
Chinese imports from its developing country partners appear to be characterised by either under-
invoicing of exports in the partner country or over-invoicing of imports in China. To reiterate, it 
cannot be determined whether this is associated with net outflows or inflows of IFFs to China. 
However, it seems likely that there is a net outflow of IFFs associated with Chinese exports to 
developing countries (mainly through under-invoicing in partner countries of Chinese 
manufactured goods), combined with a net inflow of IFFs to China associated with imports from 
developing partners (mainly through under-invoicing in partner countries of natural resource 
exports). 
Chinese exports to Africa appear to represent a particular risk for IFFs. Trade discrepancies 
suggestive of either over-invoiced Chinese exports or under-invoiced partner imports ($ million) 
represent 75% of the registered value of Chinese exports in 2018 to the selected African partners 
analysed, whilst trade discrepancies indicative of either under-invoicing of Chinese exports or 
over invoicing of partner imports represent 56% of trade value. These figures are much bigger 
than the equivalents for China's trade with the Asian partners we analysed (33% and 20% of 
trade value respectively). 
Tariff evasion is closely linked to IFFs. GFI (2015b) used trade data for the period 2008-2012 to 
identify a "robust relationship between high tariff rates and high levels of [potential trade mis-
invoicing] IFFs." This reflects the greater incentives for trade mis-invoicing for tariff-avoidance 
purposes in the face of high tariff rates. This highlights the fact that IFFs are likely to be a 
particular problem in relation to China's trade with the poorest countries, which tend to rely 
disproportionally on tariff revenue (Teltscher, 2000). 
For a few of China's developing country partners we conducted further analysis to estimate the 
likely customs revenue consequences of the discrepancies identified. For both African and Asian 
partners these results suggest potentially large losses in revenue for China's developing country 
partners, both through lost tariff revenue through under-invoiced imports and losses in 
9 
corporation tax and other revenue through the use of under-invoicing of exports to mask profit. 
The importance of that loss likely varies depending on the size of the country involved and the 
effectiveness of its overall revenue system: for example, we estimate that the upper bound for 
tariff losses for India from under-invoicing of imports from China is around 0.25% of total 
government revenue, whereas for Bangladesh the upper bound is almost 7% of government 
revenue (in both cases the most likely figure for tariff losses is significantly smaller, probably 
0.1% and 4% of government revenue specifically). 
For Chinese imports from African countries discrepancies suggestive of either under-invoiced 
partner exports or over-invoiced Chinese imports are large (30% of Chinese estimates of trade 
value), but there are very limited discrepancies suggestive of either over-invoiced partner exports 
or under-invoiced Chinese imports (1% of trade value). The figures for China's imports from Asia 
are more balanced (35% and 23% respectively). These differences seem likely to reflect the very 
high proportion of African partners' exports to China that involve natural resources, often 
resources which have been extracted by Chinese companies . This likely create stronger 
incentives for under-reporting of value at the point of export (to minimise tax liabilities) and lower 
incentives for under-invoicing of value at the point of import. 
However, part of the pattern of import discrepancies observed is likely the result of over-invoicing 
of imports on arrival in China. Under Chinese law Chinese nationals can only purchase $50,000 
of foreign exchange per year and a range of other controls make it difficult to move wealth out of 
China (Russolillo, 2019). However, despite legal sanctions, wealthy Chinese businesspeople 
have strong incentives to evade controls. This may partly reflect a drive to diversify portfolios, but 
fear of conviction and asset confiscation on corruption allegations – whether real or politically 
motivated – also likely plays a significant role (Gunter, 2017). 
Over-invoicing of imports (and under-invoicing of exports) represents an important mechanism 
used by such individuals to move wealth out of China (Cheung & Qian, 2010). Goods that are 
"high-value " and hard to value are particularly attractive for Chinese looking to move funds out of 
the country (GFI, 2017). Such products include diamonds, art and antiquities, as well as real 
estate. 
Whilst illicit Chinese capital flight is likely mainly focused on acquiring assets in regimes 
considered stable, such as Europe and the US (BBC 2016), trade-related fraud involving 
developing countries likely has lower risk of detection and IFFs from China destined for 
investment in developed countries may still therefore flow through developing countries first. 
China's exports to African developing countries 
Table 1 presents data from X source on China's exports to 12 Sub-Saharan African countries 
and the associated value gaps. For 8 out of 12, China's estimates of exports were higher than 
the partner country's estimate of imports. At HS 6-digit level the value of discrepancies indicative 
of either over-invoicing of goods on departure or under-invoicing on arrival (75% of trade value) 
were greater than for discrepancies indicative of either under-invoicing on departure or over-
invoicing on arrival (56% of trade value). The most plausible explanation for this is a pattern of 
widespread under-invoicing and misrepresentation of the HS-code of products on arrival, in order 
to minimise import tariff liability. If this is correct it suggests that Chinese exports to Africa are 
associated with net IFF outflows. 
Ghana provides an interesting case study. China's estimate of exports to Ghana are over twice 
Ghana's estimates of imports ($4.8 billion compared to $2.3 billion). At HS-6 digit level, 
discrepancies potentially indicative of under-invoicing of imports add up to $3.9 billion, 81% of 
the value of China's exports to Ghana. This is the highest out of the 12 African countries 
examined, and aligns with evidence from GFI (2020) suggesting that in 2017 Ghana trade value 
gap was the second highest out of 168 developing countries assessed. 
10 
Discrepancies are spread across a wide range of products, with the largest discrepancy relating 
to used clothing (HS 630900), where barely any imports were registered by Ghana, but $126 
million of exports to Ghana were recorded by China. This sits alongside a broader pattern of 
discrepancies in relation to Ghanaian clothing and textile imports from China, with over $642 
million less clothing and textile imports registered than China registered exports. It seems likely 
that a substantial portion of this relates to deliberate customs fraud, motivated by the drive to 
avoid high duties (20% compared to Ghana's average weighted tariff of just over 10%) in a low 
margin sector. Seizure data suggests that a substantial portion of textile imports from China are 
also likely counterfeit (OCED, 2018). Indeed, the seriousness of the problem of under-invoicing 
and counterfeiting in textile imports was recognised by the Ghanaian Government in the 2019 
budget when they extended their anti-smuggling "tax stamp" system to the sector (Deloitte, 
2018). 
An indication of the significance of this for the Ghanaian Government comes from GFI's (2014) 
estimate that over the period 2002-11 annual customs revenue losses from trade mis-invoicing 
equalled 11% of total government revenue. Given that China provides 15-20% of Ghana's 
imports this suggests revenue losses from mis-invoicing of Chinese imports of around 1.6-2.2% 
of government revenue. A simple estimate using 2018 data suggests even greater impact. Based 
on Ghana's overall weighted average tariff rate of 10% and the $2.4 billion net value gap, the 
2018 trade discrepancies suggest that the range of possible tariff consequences of trade mis-
invoicing was between $146 million of additional revenue and $391 million of revenue losses, 
with a plausible estimate being around $240 million of net losses. The latter figure represents 
around 3% of Ghana's total government revenue of $8 billion in 2018, and 60% of Ghana's 
shortfall in receipts relative to budgeted revenue in 2018 (Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2019). 
Even allowing for a large margin of error, this suggests that the revenue impact is likely 
significant in Ghana. 
The picture that emerges from this analysis largely aligns with previous research. GFI (2018a) 
found that in Nigeria imports from China are "particularly prone" to revenue risks. The report 
identifies vehicle imports from China as a key risk, potentially reflecting the relatively high tariff 
rates applied, whilst noting that apparent under-invoicing and consequent revenue losses from 
Chinese imports relate to "many goods" (GFI, 2018). For Uganda in 2016, GFI (2018b) identify 
$50 million per year of under-invoicing (15% of trade value) and $26 million of over-invoicing (8% 
of trade value) of imports from China. GFI (2018c) also report high risk of revenue loss in Kenya, 
with under-invoicing of Chinese imports creating an estimated $80 million in revenue losses 
2016. This represents 38% of all revenue losses identified from under-invoicing, reflecting the 
high value of imports from China rather than a high tariff revenue loss to trade ratio. 
The 2018 data for South Africa is striking because discrepancies indicative of under-invoicing 
and of over-invoicing of imports are both large (more than $12 billion each). A GFI (2018d) report 
provides some evidence that a substantial proportion of this likely does reflect customs fraud. 
Unusually, the research benefited from access to a multi-year South African Revenue Service 
database, which enabled identification of individual transactions where the unit cost of imports 
was significantly higher or lower than the median unit cost for that line. This is indicative of under-
invoicing and over-invoicing respectively and potentially captures forms of trade-related IFFs that 
are invisible in aggregated data (e.g. double-invoice faking). Overall, their analysis reveals a 
pattern of under-invoicing of relatively low value import commodities, such as plastics, and of 
products facing high effective tariff rates, combined with over-valuation of high-value goods (such 
as vehicles), potentially reflecting money laundering and capital flight. 
GFI (2018d) showed that 82% of imports from China by value were priced below the median 
price for their relevant product line, and 52% by value were 'very under-priced' (below the 25th 
percentile price for that product line). The average effective tariff rate on 'very under-priced' 
imports from China was 12.2%, significantly higher than the 8.5% average tariff on imports from 
China, providing further evidence that tariff evasion underlies observed discrepancies. Even 
assuming that the scale of under-invoicing from China was no greater than for others, based on 
GFI's (2018d) data it is plausible that in the period 2010-14 South Africa may have suffered 
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$720 million in lost government revenue per year (including both tariff and other tax 
losses) from under-invoicing of Chinese imports (15% of South Africa's imports come from 
China and the report estimates total revenue losses from under-invoicing of imports of $4.8 
billion a year). This represents 0.9% of South Africa's $86 billion (1.2 trillion Rand) of total 
government revenue in 2018 (IMF, 2020a). In reality this could be an under-estimate, since the 
correlation between under-pricing and the effective tariff rate was much stronger for China than 
for developed countries. 
Even in countries where our analysis implies that the scale of mis-invoicing is comparatively 
small, more anecdotal evidence suggests it can be a serious problem. One example concerns 
Namibia, where discrepancies indicative of possible under-invoicing of imports added up to just 
$183 million, the lowest level in our sample in both absolute terms and as a proportion of trade 
volume (at 57%). However, in December 2017 a Chinese businessman and a local customs 
official were arrested and charged with customs fraud: they had declared R213 million ($12 
million) of imports of rags, whilst actually importing clothing and remitting payments exceeding 
R3.1-billion ($170 million) (Grobler, 2019). The scale of this single case suggests that the true 
scale of import under-invoicing may be greater than it appears from the data, possibly reflecting 
'double invoice faking' which does not show up obviously in trade figures
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Total 
Trade 
China Figures ($ million) 2,235 1,890 4,822 1,016 1,869 808 319 3,591 706 16,337 969 446 
Partner Figures ($ million) 2,307 1,642 2,273 824 799 936 439 1,771 1,184 17,087 1,291 358 
Discrepancy total trade figures ($ 
million) 
-72 248 2,549 192 1,070 -128 -120 1,820 -478 -750 -322 88 
Analysis 
at HS 6-
digit 
level 
Over-invoiced Chinese exports/under-
invoiced partner imports ($ million) 
1,621 1,220 3,911 624 1,268 483 183 2,721 486 12,606 712 286 
Over-invoiced Chinese exports/under-
invoiced partner imports (% trade 
value) 
73% 65% 81% 61% 68% 60% 57% 76% 69% 77% 73% 64% 
Under-invoiced Chinese exports/over-
invoiced partner imports ($ million) 
1,272 737 1,466 359 460 505 129 1,009 613 12,305 678 140 
Under-invoiced Chinese exports/over-
invoiced partner imports (% trade 
value) 
57% 39% 30% 35% 25% 63% 40% 28% 87% 75% 70% 31% 
Gross 'value gap' 2,893 1,957 5,377 983 1,728 988 312 3,730 1,099 24,911 1,390 426 
Gross 'value gap' (% of trade value) 129% 104% 112% 97% 92% 122% 98% 104% 156% 152% 143% 96% 
Source: analysis utilises data for 2018 extracted from UN's COMTRADE (reproduced with permission) and the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) databases (licensed under 
a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)
 
 
China's exports to Asian developing countries 
Table 2, below, presents data on China's exports to eight Asian developing countries. For five 
out of the eight countries Chinese estimates of exports were greater than the partner country's 
estimates of imports. At HS 6-digit level the value of discrepancies indicative of either over-
invoicing of goods on departure or under-invoicing on arrival (37% of trade value) were greater 
than for discrepancies indicative of either under-invoicing on departure or over-invoicing on 
arrival (21% of trade value). As with Chinese exports to African partners, this pattern likely largely 
reflects widespread under-invoicing and misrepresentation of the HS-code of products on arrival, 
in order to minimise import tariff liability. If this is correct it suggests that Chinese exports to Asian 
developing country partners are associated with net IFF outflows from China. 
Chinese trade with India is an important case study given the huge volume of trade (almost $77 
billion of Chinese exports in 2018). GFI (2019a) report that in 2016 two thirds of India's imports 
assessed as potential sources of revenue loss were from China, with Chinese electrical 
machinery (HS 85) imports assessed as particularly high-risk. Our analysis of 2018 trade data at 
HS-6-digit level suggest under-invoicing of $19.9 billion of imports (26% of declared Chinese 
exports) and over-invoicing of $15.5 billion (20% of declared Chinese exports). This suggests 
significant trade mis-invoicing could be taking place. This largely reflecting the scale of imports 
from China; GFI (2019a) notes that for India trade discrepancies as a share of trade value are 
lower for China than for many of its other partners. 
GFI's (2019a) estimate that India lost $9 billion of revenue from under-invoicing of imports in 
2016, suggests that under-invoicing of imports from China alone could be creating billions of 
dollars of revenue losses annually. We estimated potential revenue losses for 2018 by assessing 
the tariff value of both positive and negative discrepancies at HS 6-digit level (with tariff rates 
estimated using India's UNCTAD-method weighted ad valorem equivalent effective tariff, as 
published through the WITS trade and tariff database). Our calculations suggest that in the 
worst-case the loss could have been $1.7 billion, though a more plausible loss is probably 
around $690 million. This represents just 0.9% of the value of Chinese exports to India and 0.1% 
of Indian government revenue (IMF, 2019b). 
Estimates of the tariff cost for Pakistan reveal a similar pattern, but are proportionally more 
significant. Based on our analysis, in the worst case the Pakistani Government may have 
suffered $744 million of tariff losses from trade mis-invoicing of Chinese imports. However, 
based on the data it seems most plausible that Pakistan lost somewhere in the region of 
$488 million of tariff revenue from mis-invoicing of Chinese imports, i.e. 3% of the value of 
Chinese exports.  For comparison, total Pakistani customs revenue in FY2018 /19 was 685 
billion Pakistani rupees ($4.4 billion) and total Pakistani Government revenue (excluding grants) 
was 4,901 billion Pakistani rupees ($31 billion), meaning that lost revenue from Chinese 
imports was plausibly around 12% of total customs receipts and 1.5% of total Pakistani 
government revenue (IMF, 2019c). 
For Myanmar at HS 6-digit level there are $6.4 billion of discrepancies indicative of possible 
under-invoicing of imports, of which $866 million of relate to mobile telephones (HS 851712) and 
$216 million to motorcycles with small engines (HS 871120). The latter is striking because it 
aligns with a 2013 claim by a Burmese politician that over 80% of Myanmar's four million 
motorbikes were illegally imported (GFI, 2015a). Based on Myanmar's tariff schedule these 
discrepancies suggest a worst-case tariff loss to Myanmar of around $433 million, with a 
likely loss of around $306 million. This is the equivalent of 75% of Myanmar's customs 
revenue collection or 2.5% of total government revenue for FY2018/19 (IMF, 2019a). This is 
striking given the IMF's emphasis on Myanmar's weak revenue to GDP ratio and the importance 
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of the country increasing revenue mobilisation. As always, these figures do not take account of 
the revenue impact of smuggling, where the goods are never registered by customs authorities. 
This is likely to be a particular issue for Myanmar since smuggling with China is "especially 
prevalent" (GFI, 2015a), reflecting the porous borders and weak government control in many 
remote areas. 
Estimates of tariff losses for Bangladesh are the most worrying of all. For 2015 (the most recent 
available data) in the worst-case cost tariff losses could have been around $1.4 billion, and a 
plausible figure for Bangladeshi tariff losses in 2015 is around $804 million. This is the 
equivalent of 4% of Bangladesh's total government revenue (excluding grants) in FY2015 
(IMF, 2017). 
In contrast, GFI's estimates of lost revenue for Indonesia in 2016 from under-invoicing of imports 
from China are small. They identify Chinese imports of plastics (HS 39) and vehicles (HS 87) as 
being particular issues, and estimate that trade mis-invoicing of imports from China could have 
caused a loss of $80 million of customs revenue, the largest out of any of Indonesia's trade 
partners (GFI, 2019b), but just 0.2% of the value of China's exports to Indonesia.
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Table 2: Chinese exports to Asia 
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Total Trade China Figures ($ million) 668 76,881 397 10,568 16,967 5,547 13,895 967 
Partner Figures ($ million) 1,166 73,605 488 6,223 14,486 1,942 10,349 1,267 
Discrepancy total trade figures ($ million) -498 3,276 -91 4,345 2,481 3,605 3,546 -300 
Analysis at HS 
6-digit level 
Over-invoiced Chinese exports/under-
invoiced partner imports ($ million) 
97 19,875 130 6,440 5,904 4,450 7,581 497 
Over-invoiced Chinese exports/under-
invoiced partner imports (% trade value) 
15% 26% 33% 61% 35% 80% 55% 51% 
Under-invoiced Chinese exports/over-
invoiced partner imports ($ million) 
430 15,535 211 2,239 3,484 697 3,497 654 
Under-invoiced Chinese exports/over-
invoiced partner imports (% trade value) 
64% 20% 53% 21% 21% 13% 25% 68% 
Gross 'value gap' 527 35410 341 8679 9388 5147 11078 1151 
Gross 'value gap' (% of trade value) 79% 46% 86% 82% 55% 93% 80% 119% 
Tariff impact 
from import 
under-invoicing 
Worst case' ($ million) N/K. -1,781 N/K. -433 -744 N/K. 1,369 N/K. 
Likely value ($ million) N/K. -690 N/K. -306 -488 N/K. -804 N/K. 
Best case' ($ million) N/K. 1,091 N/K. 127 256 N/K. 564 N/K. 
Source: analysis utilises data for 2018 extracted from UN's COMTRADE (reproduced with permission) and the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) databases (licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)
 
2 Afghan data used HS2012 classification, whilst China used the newer HS 2017 classification, which reduces the comparability of this data. 
3 Revenue impact estimates for Myanmar utilise 'simple average' estimates, reflecting the absence of 'weighted average' rates on WITS. 
 
4 2015 data – last available. 
5 2017 data – last available. 
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China's imports from African countries 
Table 3, below, presents data on China's imports from twelve African developing countries. For 
every one of them Chinese estimates of imports were greater than the partner country's 
estimates of exports. Analysis at HS 6-digit level provides little evidence for significant over-
invoicing of exports leaving partner countries (or under-invoicing of imports arriving in China), 
with the exception of Namibia. The scale of under-invoicing of exports (or over-invoicing of 
imports arriving in China) is much greater (averaging 37% of China's estimates of trade value), 
but varies hugely across partner countries both in absolute terms (from $15 million for Uganda to 
over $10 billion for South Africa) and as a proportion of trade value trade value (from 8% for 
Namibia to 68% for Zambia). 
Below we consider three particularly striking discrepancies identified, related to: (1) Angolan 
crude oil; (2) South African diamonds; and (3) Zambian copper. 
Angolan crude oil 
Around 10% of China's $239 billion of crude oil imports come from Angola and around 64% of 
Angola's oil exports go to China. There is a huge discrepancy related to Angolan crude oil (HS 
270900), with Chinese estimates of imports $2.7 billion greater than Angolan estimates of 
exports in 2018, with a further $350 million of discrepancies related to two other oil-related trade 
lines. This is responsible for the vast majority of the $3.4 billion net trade value gap in China's 
imports from Angola. Whilst the size of discrepancies varies, the same pattern holds over the 
period 2014-2018 with cumulative discrepancies of almost $9 billion. 
Whilst the causes of these discrepancies are inevitably hard to determine, the data is consistent 
with a common pattern by which under-invoicing of Africa's natural resource exports is utilised by 
corporations in order to hide profits (and therefore tax liabilities) locally whilst shifting those 
profits abroad (LeBlanc, 2014). As UNECA notes, such practices are often linked to "unequal 
contracts", in which large companies bribe government officials to secure natural resource 
concessions on very favourable terms, and then use of export under-invoicing to extract the 
excess profit. 
If this is in fact the case, then the observed discrepancies represent a net IFF outflow from 
Angola to China. The extent of Chinese involvement in Angola's oil sector lends additional 
plausibility to this interpretation of the observed discrepancies. For example, China’s Sinopec 
has formed a 50:50 joint venture with Angola's state oil company, which has a 50% interest in 
Angola's BP-operated offshore Block 18 field, as well as stakes in eight other Angolan oil fields 
(Vella, 2019). 
The revenue impact for Angola of oil-related IFFs to China is potentially huge. Angola's 
petroleum production tax is levied at a rate of 20% on the value of oil produced (10% for 
"marginal oil fields"), and the rate of petroleum revenue tax is 50% of profits (petroleum 
production tax is not deductible) for foreign joint ventures (Government of Angola, 2004). If the 
observed discrepancies do represent under-invoicing of oil exports from Angola, this 
suggests $270-540 million in lost petroleum production tax revenue and potentially up to 
$1.35 billion in lost petroleum revenue tax revenue for the Angolan Government.6 This is 
around 10% of Angola's total government revenue in FY2018 (IMF, 2019d). 
 
6 Assuming companies declared all expenses, so that the discrepancy is pure margin. 
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Box 2: indebtedness and Chinese political influence in Angola 
The Angolan case is suggestive of the potential interlinkage between IFFs and the political 
leverage China has in developing countries to which it is a major financier. By 2018 Angola 
owed $23.5 billion to China, and it borrowed a further $2 billion in October 2018 (Reuters, 
2018b). This debt mainly related to infrastructure projects which supported Angola's 
reconstruction following the civil war, projects which are often implemented by Chinese state-
owned enterprises. Angola's need to maintain access to Chinese loans would likely make it 
more difficult for the Angolan Government to take a firm line on tax evasion by large Chinese 
firms. To the extent that high levels of indebtedness to China makes developing country 
governments dependent on Chinese good-will, it is therefore likely to increase risks related to 
IFF outflows through transfer mispricing and export under-invoicing by Chinese firms. 
South African diamonds 
Analysis at HS 6-digit level reveals around $10.7 billion of discrepancies where Chinese 
estimates of imports from South Africa exceeded South African estimates of exports to China. 
There were just $251 million of discrepancies where South African estimates exceeded Chinese 
estimates. 
$4.2 billion of the discrepancies relate to a single line: cut, non-industrial diamonds (HS 710239). 
South Africa reported just $131,000 of exports of any kind of diamond to China, whilst China 
reported $4.8 billion of diamond imports from South Africa. Indeed, every year between 2014 and 
2018 China reported more than $3 billion of imports of diamonds from South Africa, whilst South 
Africa never reported more than $1.3 million. 
One possibility might be that the discrepancy relates simply to misclassification of diamonds 
flowing through South Africa from neighbouring countries en route to China. Analysis of data on 
the regional diamond trade (see Figure 2 for an illustration) shows that this is not plausible: the 
volume of diamonds China reports importing from South Africa are more than an order of 
magnitude larger than the volume of diamonds being exported to South Africa by its key diamond 
producing neighbours, Botswana and Namibia (no trade was reported for Zimbabwe, another 
significant diamond producer). Whether the diamonds registered by China as imports from South 
Africa are actually South African diamonds or come from one of South Africa's neighbours, it is 
clear that the vast majority of diamonds are not being reported as exports to China by any of 
these countries. 
Another possibility might be that the discrepancy is created by South Africa exporting to other 
countries, which then re-export the diamonds to China. This might lead to China registering 
diamond imports from South Africa, whilst South Africa registers the diamonds as exports to a 
third country. If this was the case one would expect to see that South Africa's overall estimates of 
diamond exports matched relatively closely with the overall estimates of diamond imports from 
South Africa registered by countries the world over. However, in fact, there is a large 
discrepancy: analysis of UN COMTRADE data reveals that in 2018 South Africa registered just 
over $2 billion of diamond exports in total, whereas 36 countries registered a grand total of over 
$9 billion in diamond exports from South Africa, with China reporting by far the most imports from 
South Africa. Even allowing for the possibility of some double counting in partner country data 
(due to both primary exports and some re-exports from South Africa showing up in partner 
country data) the sheer size of this discrepancy suggests mis-invoicing is likely occurring at 
scale. 
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Figure 2: Diamond trading within southern Africa and with China 
Source: UN COMTRADE data  
It is probably impossible to disentangle how much of the discrepancy relates to mis-labelling of 
complex trade flows and how much relates to genuine IFFs. However, the diamond industry is 
known to be responsible for significant IFFs and it seems likely that to a significant extent this 
represents under-invoicing of exports from South Africa, and therefore involves large IFF 
outflows from South Africa to China. This could be linked to illegal mining in South Africa and 
cross-border smuggling from neighbouring countries, issues acknowledge as major problems by 
the South African government (FATF, 2013). South Africa charges a 5% 'Diamond Export Levy' 
(SARS, 2019). If the discrepancy related solely to under-invoicing of diamond exports, this could 
therefore represent up to $210 million in lost customs revenue for South Africa. This does not 
account for any lost revenue through the impact of artificially reduced company profits on 
reduced corporation tax receipts and any impact of under-reporting of production on Resource 
Royalty Tax receipts. 
However, some of the discrepancy may also relate to over-valuation of diamond imports in 
China.  Over-invoicing of diamond purchases is a well-documented mechanism used in money 
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laundering. Diamonds are suited to money laundering because of the "very high value of the 
commodity and the lack of known and stable prices for diamonds which allows for the 
manipulation of price" (FATF, 2013). For the same reasons it represents a convenient means of 
moving money abroad whilst evading foreign exchange restrictions and capital controls (FATF, 
2013), a likely motivation given tight limits on foreign exchange purchase for Chinese citizens. 
Zambian copper 
China's estimates of overall imports from the Zambia are $4.1 billion, whilst Zambia's estimates 
of its exports to China are just $1.3 billion. At HS-6-digit level discrepancies indicative of under-
invoicing of exports on departure from Zambia (or over-invoicing of imports on arrival) add up to 
$2.8 billion, with just $33 million of discrepancies indicative of over-invoicing or exports (or under-
invoicing of imports on arrival). 
The discrepancy overwhelmingly relates to a single line: Zambia estimated $942 million of 
unrefined copper (HS 740200) exports to China, whilst China estimated £3.2 billion of imports 
from Zambia (a $2.3 billion discrepancy). This pattern shows up consistently in Zambia's trade 
data, but as has been pointed out by Forstater (2017), there are good reasons for thinking that 
most of this does not reflect genuine IFFs. For example, in 2018 Zambia reported $4.3 billion of 
copper exports globally, whereas other countries reported $5 billion of imports from Zambia. This 
represents a discrepancy of just $780 million, significantly smaller than that for China alone, 
indicating that a decent proportion of the discrepancy relates to China identifying as imports from 
Zambia copper that Zambia recorded as imports to other countries and which were then re-
exported to China. 
However, under-invoicing of exports likely also makes a contribution to the discrepancy. 
Zambia's copper industry has previously been linked to large scale tax evasion and illicit financial 
flows, notably in relation to allegations of transfer mispricing and misrepresentation of costs by 
the Swiss firm Glencore (ActionAid, 2011). Estimates of the revenue loss to Zambia from under-
invoicing of copper exports (from mining companies utilising transfer mispricing) of $500 million 
have been reported (Readhead, 2016), though the credibility of such high estimates has been 
challenged (Forstater, 2017). 
Diplomatic tensions have arisen between China and Zambia in relation to illegal small-scale 
copper mining by Chinese immigrants (Reuters, 2017). At the other end of the spectrum, large 
Chinese companies are major players in the Zambian copper mining industry – notably through 
NFC Africa, a subsidiary of the Chinese SOE China Non-ferrous Metals Company Limited 
(CNMC), which operates several large mines (Reuters, 2018a). In 2015 Zambia's former Minister 
for Mines was accused of interfering in order to secure a mining licence for Zhongui International 
Mining Industry Group Limited, a Chinese company (Redhead, 2016). He was convicted, but was 
later released from jail when he won an appeal. Whilst he was later released from jail on appeal 
(Lusaka Times, 2017) this case combined with the known risk of transfer-pricing in relation to 
Zambian copper exports, highlights the risk of Chinese mining companies (like other international 
firms) using bribery to secure unequal contracts and then under-invoicing exports to China to 
circumvent tax liabilities. 
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Table 3: Chinese imports from Africa 
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Total trade 
 
China figures ($ million) 25,652 254 2,426 215 651 37 503 394 47 27,240 4,132 890 
Partner figures ($ million) 22,204 178 2,032 141 302 34 499 145 32 8,551 1,308 36 
Discrepancy ($ million) 3,448 76 394 74 349 3 4 249 15 18,689 2,824 854 
Trade value 
gap (HS 6-
digit) 
 
Under-invoiced partner exports/over-invoiced Chinese imports ($ 
million) 
3,426 98 344 81 399 18 41 134 15 10,654 2,796 477 
Under-invoiced partner exports/over-invoiced Chinese imports (% 
trade value) 
13% 39% 14% 38% 61% 49% 8% 34% 32% 39% 68% 54% 
Over-invoiced partner exports/under-invoiced Chinese imports ($ 
million) 
10 21 11 10 49 17 427 51 0 251 33 0 
Over-invoiced partner exports/under-invoiced Chinese imports (% 
trade value) 
0% 8% 0% 5% 8% 46% 85% 13% 0% 1% 1% 0% 
Source: analysis utilises data for 2018 extracted from UN's COMTRADE (reproduced with permission) and the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) databases (licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0) 
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China's imports from Asian countries 
For six out of the 10 Asian countries assessed, China's estimates of its imports were greater than the partner's 
estimates of its exports to China. At HS 6-digit level, discrepancies indicative of potential under-invoicing at the 
point of departure (or over-invoicing on arrival) averaged 26% of trade value, whilst those indicative of over-
invoicing at the point of departure averaged 16% of trade value. 
Certain lines are particularly noteworthy. For example, Chinese estimates of diamond imports from India were 
$2.6 billion greater than Indian estimates of exports. This is significant both because of the size of the 
discrepancy, the consistency with the pattern already identified for South African diamond exports to China and 
because the diamond trade is known to be a major tool used in international money laundering. Indeed, FATF 
(2013) describes diamond over-invoicing involving India and Hong Kong, though involving the import of 
diamonds by India rather than exports. From the trade data alone it is impossible to know whether discrepancies 
relate to under- or over-valuation of products. It seems plausible that the discrepancy identified relates, at least 
in part, to Chinese businesspeople illegally moving funds out of China whilst avoiding foreign exchange and 
capital controls (see section below), and reducing domestic tax liabilities. 
Another discrepancy very likely related to substantial IFFs involves Myanmar reporting $713 million less tin ore 
exports to China than China reports receiving, a pattern of discrepancies that began to emerge from 2013 and 
peaked in 2017. This aligns with the trajectory of production at the Man Maw mine near the border with China, 
which attracted global attention in 2015 (Reuters, 2016). Importantly, the mine, which has received substantial 
Chinese investment, is under the control of Myanmar's largest armed opposition group, the Wa State Army, 
which is on a US sanctions list for drugs trafficking. Tin from the mine is exported to China, almost certainly 
without the central government receiving any revenue and without inclusion in Myanmar's official trade statistics.  
Box 3: Smuggling of Burmese jade to China 
Jade is one of Myanmar's most important natural resources, but huge illegal smuggling of jade from Burma to 
China, combined with under-declaration of the price of jade to reduce tax liabilities (NGRI, 2019), means that 
the country is unable to make full use of this valuable resource to support economic development. 
The scale of the impact is difficult to quantify due to inadequate data. However, a 2015 report by Global 
Witness (2015a) estimates that Myanmar's 2014 jade production should have been worth around $31 billion 
(almost 50% of the country's GDP). Almost all of it ends up in China??, but Chinese import data from 2014 
showed only $12 billion of jade imports. Global Witness (2015a) quotes estimates from industry sources that 
"50%-80% of jade is smuggled straight over the Myanmar-China border" to avoid taxes. The Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (2019) estimates that the Burmese Government only collected revenue on 2-5% of jade 
production in 2014/15 and suggests that unrealistically high official tax rates on jade mining contribute to the 
problem by creating huge incentives to avoid payment, including through bribery of state officials . 
Global Witness (2015a) claims illegal jade mining and cross-border smuggling both feeds on and "fuels 
corruption" in Myanmar. Both senior Burmese military figures and armed opposition groups have huge stakes 
in jade mining and smuggling. The connection between jade mining and criminality should be clear from the 
fact that fifty of Burma's jade mines are reported to be under the control of Wei Hsueh Kang, a financier of the 
Wa State Army who has also been described as the "architect of the methamphetamine epidemic" in 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, as well as the profitability of jade, figures such as Kang are attracted to jade mining 
because it provides an opportunity for "laundering drugs money through official gems emporiums" by "bidding 
on their own jade at artificially inflated prices" (Global Witness, 2015b). 
China's official data on jade imports (under HS7103) from Myanmar fell precipitously from 2014, from $12 
billion in 2014, to $1.6 billion in 2015, and then down to just $48 million in 2016. In 2018 it stood at just $90 
million. This likely reflects a moratorium placed on jade production by the Burmese Government, which came 
to an end in late 2018 (Global Witness, 2018). However, illegal mining is believed to have continued at scale 
throughout this period (Beech, 2017), so it is likely that large-scale smuggling continued throughout that period 
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but is largely unrecorded in official trade statistics. Indeed, Chinese media reported $56.5 million of sales in 
March 2019 through a single jade market in Yunnan Province (Thomas, 2019). 
Chinese online payment systems such as Alipay and WeChat Pay, and e-commerce platforms such as 
TaoBao, are believed to play a key role in the illegal trade and therefore to contribute to loss of income for the 
Burmese Government (Thomas, 2019). In addition, illegal Chinese investment in Burmese jade mines is 
understood to be very significant, with Global Witness (2015a) estimating that 70% of financing for the major 
mining initiatives comes from China. 
Other discrepancies that stand out include Vietnam reporting $7.1 billion fewer mobile phone exports to China 
than China reports receiving, an extreme instance of a consistent pattern of apparent under-invoicing on 
departure (or over-invoicing on arrival) that has shown up for this trade line every year since 2009 with an 
accumulated discrepancy of over $12 billion. For India, there is also a discrepancy of $1.5 billion for petroleum-
related exports to China, indicative of either over-invoicing on departure or under-invoicing on arrival. This is a 
fairly consistent pattern since 2010, with over $6.7 billion of net discrepancy over this period. This discrepancy 
potentially reflects tariff evasion; if the discrepancies represent under-invoicing of imports, the tariff loss for 
China would have been around $336 million over this period.  
  
 
 
Table 4: Chinese imports from Asia 
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Trade 
figures 
  
China figures ($ million) 24 
34,15
5 
18,85
0 
1,377 7 4,719 2,180 
44,91
9 
64,08
7 
54 
Africa figures ($ million) 28 
27,12
7 
16,36
6 
1,717 0 5,560 1,754 
30,15
7 
41,36
6 
61 
Discrepancy total trade figures ($ million) -4 7,028 2,484 -340 7 -841 426 14762 22,721 -7 
Trade 
value 
gap (HS 
6-digit)  
Under-invoiced partner exports/over-invoiced 
Chinese imports ($ million) 
0 8,021 6,790 315 1 1,636 596 
17,86
6 
20,84
8 
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Under-invoiced partner exports/over-invoiced 
Chinese imports (% trade value) 0% 23% 36% 23% 14% 35% 27% 40% 33% 30% 
Over-invoiced partner exports/under-invoiced 
Chinese imports ($ million) 
1 1,506 4,113 894 0 1,635 168 3,028 7,560 0 
Over-invoiced partner exports/under-invoiced 
Chinese imports (% trade value) 4% 4% 22% 65% 0% 35% 8% 7% 12% 0% 
Source: analysis utilises data for 2018 extracted from UN's COMTRADE (reproduced with permission) and the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) databases (licensed under 
a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0)
 
 
4. Corruption-related IFFs between China and developing 
country partners in Africa and Asia 
Corruption and IFFs are intimately connected. Based on the IMF definition IFFs occur any time 
funds flow across borders that are destined to be used to pay bribes or which are the proceeds of 
corrupt practices. 
China's FDI stocks in Africa have increased rapidly in the past fifteen years, rising from less than 
a billion in 2004 to over $46 billion in 2018 (China Africa Research Initiative, 2020). Between 
2014 and 2018 over $18 billion of FDI flowed from China into Africa. Over 50% of China's FDI 
stocks in Africa are focused on mining and construction, two notoriously corruption prone 
sectors. A large proportion of stocks are also situated in countries with economies focused 
around natural resources and with poor track records for corruption, such as the DRC, Zambia, 
Angola and Zimbabwe. The scale of Chinese FDI in Africa means that, even if only a minority of 
investments involve corrupt practices, the scale of corruption-related IFF flows between China 
and Africa are likely large. 
Frequent allegations have been made related to corrupt practices linked to Chinese FDI in Africa. 
Transparency International notes in a 2019 article that "several Chinese companies, including 
the China Energy Fund Committee, the telecommunications firm ZTE and the China Roads and 
Bridge Construction Company, have been accused of bribing senior government officials in Chad 
and Uganda, Zambia and Kenya, respectively." In March 2019 Chi Ping Patrick Ho, the CEO of 
the CEFC China Energy Company, was sentenced to three years in jail in the USA "for his role in 
a multi-year, multimillion-dollar scheme to bribe top officials of Chad and Uganda in exchange for 
business advantages" (US Department of Justice, 2019). In 2013 a $210 million contract 
between China's ZTE and the Zambian Government related to CCTV provision in Zambia's 
capital was terminated due to allegations of corruption, including concerns that the contract was 
overvalued to the tune of $100 million (IDG News Service, 2013). The US Heritage Foundation 
claims that another major Chinese telecommunications company, Huawei, has a "proven track 
record of engaging in corruption and other dodgy business dealings" in Africa (Meservey, 2018). 
In Algeria ZTE and Huawei were banned from public tenders after multi-billion-dollar corruption 
allegations. 
In 2018 Zimbabwe's Government released a list of companies they allege had illegally 
transferred money out of the country (The Herald, 2018). 109 of the 157 companies listed were 
alleged to have illegally transferred money to China, with Chinese mining companies particularly 
prominent in the list. The most egregious case involved Chinese diamond mining company 
AFECC, trading as a joint venture with the Zimbabwean Government under the name Jinan 
Mining, which was alleged to have illegally failed to repatriate almost $333 million dollars of 
export proceeds, involving IFFs to "Botswana, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Dubai and 
China" (Pickles, 2019). 
The combination of the large scale of Chinese FDI in Africa and the frequency of corruption 
allegations against Chinese firms in Africa, makes it likely that large volumes of IFFs are flowing 
between China and African countries. Notably this relates to profits linked to corrupt deals and 
bribery are being transferred out of African companies by Chinese companies. Trade-mis-
invoicing – through under-invoicing of exports and illegal transfer pricing – are likely utilised for a 
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portion of corruption-related IFFs. However, a high portion of profits derived from corrupt 
practices are likely to flow through the formal banking sector. 
5. IFFs related to the trade in illegal goods 
Any cross-border financial flows related to the trade in illegal products and to other forms of 
transnational crime (such as people trafficking) are by definition IFFs. Such flows can relate to 
transactions inherent to such criminal enterprises (e.g. moving money internationally to pay for 
drugs) and can also relate to laundering of the proceeds of such crimes. This section first 
discusses money laundering related IFFs in the context of China, and then briefly discusses six 
key forms of transnational crime relevant to IFFs between China and developing countries. 
Money laundering 
China ranks 19th highest globally for money laundering risk on the 2019 Basel Anti-Money 
Laundering Index (Basel Institute on Governance, 2019), with a score of 6.59/10, a deterioration 
of 0.57 points from 2018. An Associated Press (2016) has described China as "emerging as an 
international hub for money laundering." According to the US State Department (2019) "Chinese 
authorities identify illegal fundraising; cross-border telecommunications fraud; weapons of mass 
destruction, proliferation finance, and other illicit finance activity linked to North Korea; and 
corruption in the banking, securities, and transportation sectors" as particular money laundering 
challenges. 
There is little evidence on the scale of money laundering through China from developing 
countries, but it seems likely that the scale is substantial, since China is considered "a haven" 
where criminals can "safely hide money, clean it, and pump it back into the global financial 
system" (Associated Press, 2016). 
It is also likely that IFFs flow in the opposite direction for laundering. The FATF (2020) identifies a 
number of jurisdictions in Africa (Ghana, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya) and Asia (Pakistan, 
Myanmar, Mongolia and Cambodia) considered high risk for money laundering, with North Korea 
at an even higher risk level. In addition to these countries, many developing countries score 
poorly on the Basel Anti-Money Laundering Index. In Asia this includes Afghanistan (7.76) and 
Vietnam (7.3), whilst in Africa it includes Mozambique (8.22), Liberia (7.35), Benin (7.27) and 
Sierra Leone (7.2). All these countries have strong trade and investment links with China, which 
could be used to disguise illicit flows and enable money laundering by Chinese criminals. 
Box 4: the relevance of extradition treaties to IFFs 
Because IFFs are often motivated by the desire to siphon the proceeds of corrupt or criminal 
business dealings out of the country, there is likely to be a particular risk of IFFs flowing 
between countries which do not have mutual extradition treaties. As Naheem (2017) notes: 
"many Chinese cases of money laundering involve countries where there is no extradition 
agreement with China." 
Amongst developing countries in Africa and Asia only those listed below currently have 
extradition treaties with China: 
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Sub-Saharan Africa South and Southeast Asia Central Asia 
• Angola 
• Ethiopia 
• Republic of Congo (not 
ratified) 
• Kenya (not ratified) 
• Lesotho 
• Namibia 
• South Africa 
• Senegal (not ratified) 
• Zimbabwe (not ratified) 
• Cambodia 
• Indonesia 
• Laos 
• Pakistan 
• Philippines 
• Sri Lanka (not ratified) 
• Thailand 
• Vietnam (not ratified) 
• Afghanistan 
• Uzbekistan 
• Tajikistan 
• Mongolia 
• Kazakhstan 
• Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
Narcotics 
GFI (2017) has estimated that the global narcotics trade was worth $426-625 billion in 2014 and 
a substantial proportion of IFFs globally likely relate to narcotics. 
The US State Department describes China as "a hub for drug and precursor chemical production 
and trafficking" and as a major narcotics money laundering jurisdiction (DED,2019). The drugs 
trade is facilitated by China's long international borders, which are often porous, enabling 
significant volumes of narcotics to flow across them, notably through the borders with Burma, 
Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Precursors are often exported to developing countries in Asia where the narcotics are actually 
produced. For example, Burma is a major producer of synthetic illegal drugs, but does not 
produce precursor chemicals, which are largely transported into Burma "by organised criminal 
syndicates" from China (INCSR, 2019). China is also a major source of methamphetamine and 
its precursors in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, and of "spice" (synthetic cannabinoids) 
in Uzbekistan. In 2018 15 metric tons of acetic anhydride from China were also seized in Georgia 
en route to Afghanistan to process heroin. IFFs between China and Africa also often relate, at 
least in part, to narcotics: notably in the well-publicised cases of "drugs for abalone" in South 
Africa. 
China is also a major destination and transit point for opioids produced in Southeast and 
Southwest Asia (DED, 2019). Significant quantities of opiate produced in Burma are believed to 
be smuggled across the border into China's Yunnan Province (Chin & Zhang, 2007). Chinese 
drugs officials have described opium and heroin smuggling from Central Asia (including 
Afghanistan) into China as "limited", reflecting natural barriers and the orientation of Central 
Asian suppliers towards the European market. However, there is evidence that Afghan opium 
exports to Europe are often facilitated via IFFs utilising financial intermediaries in China, with 
both trade mis-invoicing and feiqian (see box) playing a role in this process (Lain et al, 2017). 
Box 5: The role of feiqian 
Feiqian (‘flying money’) is an ancient Chinese form of banking similar to the Islamic hawala 
system. Feiqian is frequently used to facilitate international transactions, but utilising a 
mechanism that generally ensures that funds do not need to move internationally. It is 
intimately connected to IFFs involving China and the developing world, and provides a linkage 
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between trade mis-invoicing and the trade in illegal goods. It is generally invisible, since the 
only records of transfers are in the books of a close-knit community of feiqian agents, though it 
can sometimes result in balance of payments account discrepancies between developing 
countries and China.  
An exposé by investigative journalist John Grobler (2019) notes that feiqian "relies on the 
systematic under-invoicing of Chinese imports into Africa and a seamless chain of payments 
system in which accounts are settled through the transfer of high-end — and often illicit — 
goods." This includes illegal wildlife products - such as abalone, rosewood, rhino horn and 
ivory – and narcotics. "In brief: goods are undervalued on their import documentation; they are 
then sold for cash; and that undeclared cash is subsequently channelled into high-end 
commodities that are remitted to China to balance the feiqian books."  
Grobler (2019) provides various examples of feiqian-enabled IFFs between China and Africa. 
This includes in Angola following the oil price collapse of 2014, when "foreign banks refused to 
sell US dollars to Angola until all outstanding debts had been settled." Chinese traders started 
converting their worthless Angolan kwanza into rosewood logs that were smuggled via 
Namibia to China, where they were sold for "very convertible yuan." Similarly, a case in 
Namibia, involved collusion between a Chinese businessman and a customs official to avoid 
duties by systematically under-invoicing Chinese textile imports, with feiqian utilised to resolve 
real balances. 
Human trafficking 
The US State Department (2019) reports that "China is a source, destination, and transit country 
for men, women, and children subjected to forced labour and sex trafficking" and accords it "Tier 
3 status" for its lack of compliance with standards for preventing human trafficking. Trafficking 
involves IFFs as payments to traffickers and brokers flow across borders. For example, the US 
State Department reports that Chinese men pay up to $30,000 to brokers to secure foreign 
women for forced marriage, forced labour and sexual exploitation.  
The volume of IFFs involved are impossible to quantify, but are likely large given the scale of the 
problem. According to data from China's Supreme Court 1,252 people were convicted for human 
trafficking related offences in China in 2018, and this is likely to represent the tip of the iceberg in 
terms of the total number of people trafficked. Key issues include trafficking of women from 
South Asia, Northeast Asia (notably Mongolia and North Korea), Southeast Asia (notably 
Cambodia, Burma and Lao) and Africa (notably Madagascar, Rwanda and Uganda) into China 
where they are coerced into forced labour or sexual exploitation, including forced marriage. 
Trafficking of men from these countries for forced labour also occurs, notably "migrant workers 
from Shan State" in Burma subjected to "forced labour on sugarcane plantations in China’s 
Yunnan Province" (US State Department, 2019). The State Department (2019) also references 
trafficking of Chinese women to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan for 
sexual exploitation and Chinese men and women to Brunei and Sri Lanka for forced labour. 
China is also a major human trafficking transit point. 
The illegal arms trade 
Few estimates exist regarding the scale of illegal arms smuggling from China to developing 
countries. Chinese-manufactured small arms are used extensively by non-state actors across 
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developing Asia and Africa, including in conflict hotspots such as Afghanistan (Small Arms 
Survey, 2013). However, it is generally difficult to determine how much relates directly to illegal 
smuggling from China, and how much is the result of legally exported arms being subsequently 
sold on or transferred to insurgents and criminal groups. For example, China's legal arms sales 
to Sudan appear to frequently find their way to non-state actors across Eastern Africa, but this 
does not involve IFFs to or from China (UNODC, 2019). 
In contrast, Chinese-made weapons used by insurgents and criminal groups in Asia seems more 
often to be acquired through weapons smuggling from China rather than leakage from 
government-to-government sales. Smuggled Chinese weapons "account for the largest share of 
illicit weapons" in Nepal. Investigative journalists have also described the extensive use of 
smuggled Chinese-made weapons by armed non-state factions in Myanmar (Mizzima, 2019), as 
well as weapons smuggling from China through Bangladesh and on to rebel groups in India and 
Nepal (Bhaumik, 2014), and the use of Chinese made weapons by criminal smuggling 
syndicates (involved in exporting illegal wildlife products, marijuana and US dollars to China) in 
Nepal (Small Arms Survey, 2014). However, the volume of IFFs involved and the mechanisms 
deployed for transferring funds related to such illicit arms trading are unclear. 
Illegal wildlife trade 
The African Wildlife Foundation (2015) estimates that the total value of illicit wildlife trafficking 
(excluding fisheries and timber) globally is in the range $7-23 billion per year. China is likely the 
largest market for illegal African wildlife products, possibly receiving up to 70% of poached ivory 
(according to unnamed experts quoted by numerous media outlets, such as the BBC, National 
Geographic, the New York Times and others). In the first half of 2019, Nigerian customs officials 
confiscated over 50 tons of pangolin scales destined for Asia; the trade in pangolin scales is 
banned internationally and the animal is endangered (Oxpeckers, 2019). Large numbers of 
seizures occur on flights from South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia to China (ESAAMLG, 2016) and 
ivory is also known to be smuggled out of Africa in container ships bound for the ivory trafficking 
"hub" of Shuidong in Southern China (Oxpeckers, 2017). 
This illicit trade is facilitated by online trading in China, including through WeChat. Such trades 
often also involve trade mis-invoicing of legitimate products and the use of feiqian to facilitate 
international transactions, including through bribes to customs officials (Oxpeckers, 2014). For 
example, in South Africa feiqian facilitates a two-way illegal flow of methamphetamine into South 
Africa and illegally harvested abalone (a very valuable shellfish) to China (Grobler, 2019).  
China is also strongly implicated in the trade in live exotic animals from developing countries. GFI 
(2018) reports that several of the world's largest wholesale markets for captured great apes are 
in China. Some of this trade relates to smuggling proper – where the animals are never 
registered by customs authorities – with payments through WeChat or utilising complex systems 
of trade mis-invoicing schemes and fei quan. However, a substantial portion involves the "C-
Scam", where wild animals captured by poachers are falsely registered as having been bred in 
captivity. GFI (2018) reports that from "2009-2011 130 chimpanzees and 10 gorillas were 
exported from Guinea to China", registered as having been bred in captivity, despite the fact that 
Guinea has "no ape breeding facilities." For transactions of this kind international payments may 
be made using conventional payment mechanisms such as Western Union or bank transfers. 
Remarkably, Chinese vessels are also major players in illegal fishing off West Africa, with IFFs 
resulting from misrepresentation of the territorial waters in which fish were caught, under-
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reporting of catch volume and misreporting the types of fish caught. Illegal fishing contributes to 
unsustainable declines in fishery stocks, as well as loss of revenue for the relevant governments 
(GFI, 2017). 
China is also "the primary destination for the majority of illegally-sourced timber" (GFA, 2017) 
and is a major processing centre for illegal timber from "Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
Islands, and Indonesia" (GFA, 2011). The illegal timber trade is doubly damaging since it results 
both in loss of valuable habitat and natural resource for the developing countries involved and 
due to the loss in tax revenue from smuggling. 
Trade in counterfeits 
An estimated "two-thirds to three-quarters of counterfeit and pirated goods come from China" 
(GFA, 2011). The volume of trade in counterfeit goods between China and developing countries 
in Asia and Africa is unknown but is likely large. 
China is the "leading supplier of counterfeit cigarettes" globally (von Lampe et al, 2012), as 
evidenced by the fact that 83% of fake cigarettes seized in Europe and 99% of fake cigarettes 
seized in the USA originated in China. Around 62% of the illicit trade in cigarettes is in the 'Asia 
and the Pacific' region, according to the WHO – much of this stems from China. More generally, 
developing countries (notably India, Pakistan and South Africa) are major markets for counterfeit 
cigarettes from China (GFA, 2011), often routed through other developing country transit points, 
such as Namibia (World Bank, 2019).  This is backed up by seizure data (World Bank, 2019). As 
well as the reduction in tax revenues caused by cigarette smuggling, the lower tobacco prices 
caused by the glut of counterfeit Chinese cigarettes in developing country markets likely 
contribute negatively to public health outcomes both by reducing prices and because smoking 
counterfeit cigarettes causes "markedly greater exposure to toxic heavy metals than authentic 
brands" (Pappas et al, 2007). 
The global counterfeit medicine industry is likely worth between $10 billion and $200 billion 
(Ozawa et al, 2019) and has been described by the WHO (2017) as an "important threat to public 
health". China is also one of the world's biggest producers of counterfeit medicine and 
pharmaceuticals, and much of what is produced ends up in developing countries (GFI, 2017). 
The majority of pharmaceutical ingredients in counterfeit medicine in West Africa originates in 
China, with a major Nigerian police operation in 2013 undercovering huge illicit importation of 
medicine from China. Similarly, an INTERPOL investigation into fake anti-malarial medicine in 
Southeast Asia suggested that a very high proportion of it came from China (OECD, 2018). 
6. Gaps and further research 
The following issues deserve further attention: 
• Research on the role of feiqian in IFFs. There appears to have been little systematic 
analysis of how feiqian currently facilitates IFFs between China and the developing world. 
A deeper understanding of feiqian could help developing country governments better 
detect and disrupt IFFs. 
• Research on the prevalence of transfer mispricing by Chinese firms operating in the 
natural resources sector in Africa. Chinese mining companies play an increasingly large 
role in resource extraction in Africa, whilst China has become arguably the key market for 
African minerals. Media reports and some criminal investigations, combined with certain 
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trade figure discrepancies, suggest that IFFs linked to transfer mispricing and other 
practices designed to reduce tax liabilities by Chinese mining firms may be an issue. 
However, further investigation would be required to determine the true scale of the 
problem. 
• Research to improve the evidence base on the revenue impact of under-invoicing of 
imports. Almost all estimates of the tariff impact of trade mis-invoicing in developing 
countries – including those provided in this report - are based off aggregate trade data 
and unrealistic assumptions. Approaches that work with individual developing country 
customs agencies and finance ministries, to produce estimates utilising transaction-level 
data and comparisons to known international prices offer the potential for much more 
accurate estimates. GFI's (2018d) research with the South African Revenue Service 
provides a potential model. Such an approach also offers the potential to inform improved 
detection efforts by customs authorities. 
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